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ABSTRACT 
The retirement fund industry has seen a number of scandals both locally and internationally recently. These 
have left the trustees, the custodians of the large sums of monies in retirement funds, exposed to lawsuits. 
This is so because the fund members and retirees blame these trustees for negligence and lack of foresight in 
putting in place prudential standards by which their monies should be managed. 
These prudential standards are encompassed in corporate governance, as we will appreciate. 
Retirement fund governance is a subset of corporate governance; it is the mirror image of the corporate 
governance of a company, which consists of a set of relationships between company's management, board, 
shareholders and other stakeholders. The same principles that apply to business assets in general also apply 
to the management of pension assets. 
This study set out to ascertain whether or not retirement funds in South Africa do comply with the 
governance guidelines as set by the Financial Services Board (FSB). 
I selected a sample of 300 fund trustees but excluded the principal officers and tried to select an equal 
number from employee elected and employer appointed, a balance that proved to be extremely difficult to 
strike. 
The sample was randomly drawn using my colleagues for referrals as well as just calling a company asking 
for a principal officer who would refer me to the trustees. (I received a great deal of cooperation from the 
principal officers to this end). The participants represent a wide spectrum of industry sectors. They represent 
manufacturing, auto and motor industry, local government and a few from the financial services industry. 
I used a 23-question questionnaire conducting interviews both telephonically and face-to-face interactions as 
well mail. 
I managed to receive 87 responses from face-to-face interactions locally (Port Elizabeth), 67 responses from 
the mail and 60 from telephone interviews. I used a software program called statistica 6.1 to analyze my 
data and produce the frequency tables and graphs. 
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The retirement fund industry is constantly evolving to reflect changes in our unique South African 
environment. There are a number of new trends in the industry like on-line access to member information 
and total flexibility in all aspects of retirement and risk benefit management are now very common. 
The movement of risk from employer to members through the shift from defined benefit (DB) to defined 
contribution (DC) arrangements, greater demands from members and an avenue for members to register 
complaints, has increased the risk and accountability of trustees. 
Trustees are required to demonstrate how they have safeguarded the interests of the fund members and 
complied with the demands of their fiduciary duties in every decision they make. 
Ensuring that trustees can demonstrate that they have acted in good faith is the cornerstone of a system of 
good governance. 
Good governance and proper procedures are therefore no longer an ancillary but a prerequisite if trustees are 
to effectively manage their funds properly. 
Furthermore, the industry has seen a number of scandals and precedence setting cases recently. 
The Enron corporate scandal highlighted the potential damage that malfunctioning corporate governance 
can inflict on retirement savings especially from retirement funds that ignore the significance of good 
governance. 
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The Old Mutual vs. CAF case (which I'll expatiate on later), the Maxwell scandal in the United Kingdom, 
the Conrad Black scandal in Canada and quite recently the WJ Morgan vs. the Joint Municipal Pension 
Fund (where some trustees allegedly accepted some kickbacks from WJ Morgan) are just some of the 
instances where retirement fund governance has come under a great deal of public scrutiny. 
This study endeavors to address the question of whether trustees are currently complying with the principles 
of good governance 
1.2 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
Retirement funds arc charged with the welfare of beneficiaries and retirees and they carry a heavy burden of 
responsibility and yet they have a considerable discretion in fulfilling their goals and objectives. 
These funds collect contributions, invest accumulated assets with asset managers and distribute income to 
beneficiaries through their retirement. On the face of it, these are simple functions and are easily mapped. 
However, considering the vast sums of money involved functional simplicity is hardly an adequate 
characteristic of those funds. 
Retirement funds must be managed. They have administration responsibilities, make decisions regarding 
entitlements and benefits and they must ensure that long-term obligations are met in the context of risk and 
uncertainty. As such, it is arguable that retirement funds are like any other economic organizations in that 
they have goals and objectives as well as procedures by which those goals and objectives are realized. But 
most importantly they must comply with the principles of good governance. 
The King Commission issued a report on corporate governance, which followed on from increased scrutiny, 
and focus on corporate governance practices and procedures especially in the United Kingdom. 
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Much effort and energy have been spent by boards of directors and senior company management in 
improving their governance controls and procedures to ensure that they comply with the King Report on 
Corporate Governance. 
The duties of being a trustee of a retirement fund may be considered more onerous than those of a company 
director, as a retirement fund trustee is responsible for safeguarding the retirement benefits of the fund's 
members many of whom are not financially astute as the average shareholder especially in the South 
African context. 
How are these funds managing their assets, the interests of members and compliance with the ever 
increasing regulatory complexities, more onerous expectations and ensuring that proper control is exercised 
over the fund's administration? 
Are trustees aware of their fiduciary and legal duties, and what steps are they taking to ensure that they 
discharge these effectively to alleviate any risks that may accrue in their personal capacities? 
This study endeavors to answer some of these questions and maybe act as a foundation for a more in-depth 
study in this area of governance. 
1.3 MOTIVATION FOR THE RESEARCH. 
Retirement fund trustees carry a huge responsibility to effectively manage the benefits of their members. 
The basic point to ponder is whether they carry out this mandate effectively. 
Retirement fund trustees have come under a lot of scrutiny recently and we're seen this happening 
worldwide. At this heart of this is the governance issue. 
Many commentators are arguing that retirement fund governance is very much ignored by the majority of 
fund trustees. 
31... 
They cite the following governance mechanisms as the most ignored by trustees. 
• Identification and management of risks. 
• Appropriate controls to ensure that all persons and entities with operational and oversight 
responsibilities at in accordance with the objectives set out by the fund. 
• Reporting channels between all the persons and entities involved in the administration of a fund 
(those ensure the effective and timely transmission of relevant and accurate information) 
• Disclosure of information/communication to members on a timely and satisfactory manner. 
• Identification, monitoring and where necessary to address conflicts of interest. 
• Performance assessments of trustees and service providers. 
• Efficient communication channels with the fund. 
• Redress mechanisms for members and beneficiaries. 
Furthermore, it is evident that good retirement fund governance has gained momentum internationally and 
has become an imperative for every retirement fund. Corporate scandals like Enron has also highlighted 
the potential damage that malfunctioning corporate governance can inflict on retirement savings especially 
from retirement fund that given the significance of governance. There have also been other retirement 
court cases and scandal like the OM vs. CAF case (which I'll expatiate on later), Maxwell scandal in the \J¥ 
and the Command Black scandal in Canada to mention but a few. These all drew a serious attention on 
how people's retirement savings were handled by their custodians (trustees). 
On November 2000 Deloitte and Touch conducted a study on retirement governance interviewing (only) 
principal officers form 41 funds. Their findings were that retirement funds are not governed effectively and 
efficiently in SA. 
As a player in the retirement fund industry in South Africa (Retirement Fund Manager, Old Mutual 
Employee Benefits) I saw it fit to engage on a follow up study that would involve more that just principal 
officers but trustees themselves in an endeavor to prove whether these trustees are aware of what is expectec 
of them and whether they ascribe to the principle of good governance. 
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1.4 VALUE OF THE RESEARCH. 
I think this research is invaluable to the retirement fund industry and indeed to my organization. Its 
contributions, however small, can help shape the future of trustees in the retirement fund arena in South 
Africa as it elicits the shortcomings of trustees in effectively discharging their fiduciary duties and this 
protecting themselves against unnecessary risks. 
I also think that this survey can go long way in assisting to decipher the problems the trustees are faced with 
and environments in which they make all their all-important decisions regarding the members and 
pensioners monies. It could also help those who have embarked on trustees training programs in 
ascertaining the depth of what they have to deal with. I'm also one of the advocates of appropriate and 
continuous trustee training. I believe that trustees must have the necessary skills and relevant competence 
to carry out their tasks properly. 
When acting in their capacity as fund trustees they should be aware that they are not to act as representatives 
of the groups or interests from which they are drawn. They must serve all classes of beneficiaries 
impartially. It is indeed conceivable that many people appointed as fund trustees could be in a position 
where they may have a conflict between their duties as trustees and their personal interests. Where this 
problem arises they should be guided by the cordial attributes of good governance, which encompasses 
discipline, responsibility, accountability, transparency, fairness and social responsibility. 
Now, how can this paper positively contribute to all this? This study can help us (industry players) 





2.1. A PERSPECTIVE ON RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE. 
Retirement funds are by their nature subject to potential conflicts of interest arising amongst the 
stakeholders. They must, therefore, have an effective governance structure to ensure that they are managed 
in the best interests of the beneficiaries. Retirement fund governance has direct implications for retirement 
income, both in terms of its impact on administrative efficiency and on the investment strategies of the fund, 
since these two factors together determine the performance of retirement funds. In addition, pension fund 
governance affects the extent to which these institutional investors engage in shareholder activism, 
participating in the governance of the companies that they invest in. 
Good retirement fund governance has gained momentum internationally and has become a necessity for 
every retirement fund. It is no longer restricted to the activities of just public listed companies in the 
advanced economies. This is especially so in the wake of incidents like the Maxwell scandal in the United 
Kingdom where the closed pension fund of the holding companies linked to the late Robert Maxwell was 
used to prop up the share price of insolvent companies that were part of this holding. The recent Enron 
debacle has highlighted the potential damage that malfunctioning corporate governance can inflict on 
retirement savings. 
The complexity of governance is difficult to capture in a simple definition. The need for governance in any 
form of organization exists anytime a group of people comes together to accomplish a goal. It is generally 
agreed that the pivotal component of governance is decision-making. 
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According to Cadbury (1999) "Corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance 
between economic and social goals and between economic and social goals and between 
individuals and communal goals and the aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests of 
individuals, corporations and society" 
Retirement funds are independent legal entities that are established and managed mainly for the purpose of 
providing retirement and other benefits to the members of a pension fund. They function on the basis of 
agency relationships between members and beneficiaries of the fund on one hand the board of trustees and 
the service providers on the other. The governance of funds consists of all the relationships between the 
different entities and persons involved in the functioning of the retirement fund. They are, therefore, subject 
:o potential conflicts of interest arising amongst the parties involved in the management of the fund. 
Retirement Fund Governance is a subset of corporate governance. It is the mirror image of the corporate 
governance of a company, which consists of the set of relationships between the company's management, 
board, shareholders and other stakeholders. 
The same principles that apply to business assets in general also apply to the management of pension assets. 
The law does not require perfect decisions with respect to any business, including the operation of pension 
funds. It only requires reasonable decision-making processes. 
Accordingly, a good pension management system requires effective processes that encourage sound 
Elecision-making, proper and timely execution, and regular review and assessment. In the broadest sense, the ask of the governance of a pension fund can be conceived as a set of arrangements, including a well-Iefined legal and regulatory framework for the protection of the interests of members and beneficiaries of 
the fund. 
The ideal system of governance would give all the parties involved in the operation an oversight of the 
pension fund the right incentives to act in the best interests of the pension fund members and beneficiaries. 
I
What constitutes good retirement fund governance will evolve with the changing circumstances of a fund 
ind must be tailored by the Board of trustees to meet these circumstances. 
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Among the efforts at individual country level to develop pension governance guidelines, that by the 
Canadian Association of Pension Supervisory Authorities (CAPSA) may be mentioned. These guidelines 
provide a broad flexible outline of key pension fund governance principles set out under eleven principle 
headings. CAPSA defines retirement fund governance as "the structure and processes under which a pension 
plan is administered and monitored to ensure that fiduciary and other obligations with respect to the pension 
plan are fulfilled." 
2.2. A SOUTH AFRICAN CONTEXT. 
Prior to 1994, members were excluded from the management of retirement funds. For many years, 
employees campaigned for inclusion in the boards of trustees responsible for managing pension and 
provident funds. In April 1996, the Pension Funds Act was amended to create the requirement that at least 
50 % of the trustees were to be member trustees. 
Most of the member trustees elected were laymen who lacked the necessary expertise for fund management 
In contrast to this position, the skills of fund governance rested with the employer trustees. With the change 
in the composition of boards of management, trustee training is becoming more important. FSB guidance 
could be provided to ensure that there is adequate training. 
Retirement Fund Governance in South Africa presently operates within the provisions of the PFA and 
related regulations and all other applicable legislation. The objectives of the Board of Trustees are defined 
in Section 7C and 7D of the PFA. These sections have been clarified and amplified with the release by the 
FSB of Pension Fund (PF) Circulars in particular PF 96, PF 98 and PF 108. The new section 13A and 
Regulation 33 of the PFA deal with the employer's liability to pay contributions to retirement fund within 
seven working days and provides for the appoint of a Monitoring Person to oversee the whole process. 
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All these pieces of legislation and Circulars read together provide guidance to Boards for the good 
governance of funds. It should be noted, however, that the Pension Fund circulars from the Registrar of 
Pension Funds and GN notes from SARS do not constitute law but merely represent best practices, or the 
Registrar's and SARS interpretations which, by agreement, are generally adhered to in the management and 
governance of funds by organized industry. 
What is of particular note in the legislation mentioned above are: 
The emphasis on the fund rules. One of the most important duties of the Board is to give effect to the rules 
of the fund insofar as these do not conflict with the law. The rules set out the objects of the fund and how 
these are to be attained. The board is bound by these rules, and may vary them only in accordance with the 
amendment provisions set out in the Act and rules. 
In terms of section 7C(2)(a) of the Act, trustees should ensure that members are protected in terms of the 
rules of the fund and the provisions of the Act especially during amalgamations and transfers, splitting of a 
fund, termination or reduction of contributions of members and withdrawal of an employer who participates 
in a fund. 
The Board should ensure that assets and contributions of the fund are invested in accordance with the rules 
of the fund. The Board should draw up a document setting out the investment policy for the fund, including 
delegation to investment managers and custodians, where required with the procedures necessary for 
monitoring investment performances and the appropriateness of investments to the provision of benefits in 
terms of the rules. The board should declare its voting policy with regard to investments held by the fund. 
The Board should bear in mind that at all times it should act in the best interest of all fund members and that 
timeous, relevant and meaningful communication takes place with all members in a comprehensive manner 
to enable members to make balanced and informed decisions. 
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The Board must take all reasonable steps to ensure that contributions are paid timeously to the fund in 
accordance with Act. The Board is responsible for ensuring that contributions are paid into the fund in 
accordance with the Act. The employer is required to pay in full to the fund any contribution deducted from 
the member's remuneration and any contribution for which the employer is liable to pay in terms of the fund 
rules. 
The Board must ensure that proper internal control systems are in place and that standards are set for the 
monitoring and reviewing of internal controls 
The Board should ensure that an Audit Committee and Actuarial Committee are in place with the necessary 
terms of reference and reporting responsibility to those committees and the Board where relevant. 
The Board has a duty to act diligently and with due care with regard to all actions between itself and its 
members. These concepts imply that board members should discharge those duties as can reasonably be 
expected from a prudent person. 
Prudence requires the board not to assume risks without taking due account of the possible consequences. 
This includes maintaining adequate financial resources as well as maintaining effective risk management 
systems. 
The move from defined benefit to defined contribution has brought about greater focus on investment 
performance. In the new defined contribution environment a member's retirement benefits are dependent on 
the returns from the retirement fund assets. Currently, Regulation 28 of the Pension Funds Act limits only 
how much a retirement fund can invest in each asset class. 
There are no guidelines to assist trustees in their choice of asset classes. Moreover, new investment vehicles, 
such as structured products, are not specificaiiy covered by the existing regulation. To guard against 
imprudent investment by the trustees, the regulations are being revised. The proposed revisions to 
Regulation 28 set out a process for trustees on how to invest funds assets. 
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This will make it easier for trustees to evaluate the performance of the funds investment advisers and that of 
its other service providers on the basis of what is best for members and to apply that same standard in 
evaluating any proposals for change in fund operations or expenses. 
2.3. SOME INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 
Canada 
Until recently, little attention was paid to the performance of pension plans. It has only been over the last 
two or three decades that a number of pension plans have evolved into institutions with considerable 
influence in the capital markets. This, in turn, has drawn attention to the pension sector, as people 
increasingly asked questions about the relative performance of their pension plans. As their assets have 
increased, the importance of pension plans as institutional investors has grown thrusting them into the 
forefront in the debate on corporate governance in Canada. In exercising their fiduciary duty to the 
beneficiaries, pension plan managers have participated in the ongoing examination of corporate governance 
and its effect on shareholder value. 
The Association of Canadian Pension Management, which represents some 400 organizations, surveyed its 
members in late 1999 about their governance practices and found that practices vary with plan size. Large 
plans are more sophisticated than small plans, for example. The survey shows smaller-to-midsize companies 
do need to pay more attention to their pension plans if effective governance is to be assured. 
Except for the very large plans, training for pension fiduciaries appears to be an area in need of attention. 
However, a large proportion of mid-to-large size plans do choose pension committee members on the basis 
of relevant skills. 
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A large proportion of pension plans do not have a strategic plan for the pension plan. A relatively high 
proportion of plans have a structured approach for choosing and assessing investment managers. This is not 
the case, however, for plan actuaries, auditors or administrators. This may not be surprising, but it does 
identify an area for future improvement." 
The Association of Canadian Pension Management, The Pension Investment Association of Canada and the 
Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions of Canada, issued guidelines containing many 
common principles in November 1998. They formed a Joint Task Force on plan governance with a purpose 
to develop a common set of pension plan governance principles and a guide for plan administrators to 
conduct an assessment of their governance practices. The three primary objectives of the Task Force were: 
• To develop a set of governance principles which can be adopted by all types and sizes of pension plans 
across Canada, and thereby increase the effectiveness of governance practices of pension plans and 
increase protection for plan beneficiaries; 
• To develop a cost-effective self-assessment and reporting regime focused on high level issues rather 
than processes that will be flexible and applicable to all pension plans. 
• To raise the level of understanding of plan administrators concerning their accountability for decisions 
and actions affecting the pension plan and the delivery of the pension benefits. 
The Task Force recommended that every pension plan should have a clear mission as a starting point for 
proper plan governance. It would reflect the plan sponsors reason for establishing and maintaining the plan. 
The mission should be clearly distinct from the company's mission statement. The mission statement must 
address issues such as the pension entitlements and the funding policy. 
Furthermore, a code of conduct, including conflict of interest policies and procedures covering benefits 
administration and funding, as well as investments should be clearly articulated and monitored. The plans 
trustees should measure performance, including administration and funding status as well as investments, 
against pre-defined goals, adjusted for differing needs over time. 
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Measuring performance facilitates the separation of the supervision of operations from their execution. 
Performance objectives and measures should be tailored to each plan's specific requirements. Results should 
be reported to the appropriate stakeholders. 
In respect to the governing body of the plan, the trustees of the plan are legally the surrogate principals for 
the assets of the Fund. They should understand financial markets, risk management, actuarial principles, 
contractual documents and fiduciary duties. 
Australia. 
In an increasingly competitive environment, the pressure is on superannuating funds to attain a five-star 
rating in terms of fund governance. The Association of Superannuating Funds of Australia ("AFSA") Best 
Practice Committee has developed a set of guidelines, set out below, aiming to assist trustees in identifying 
and addressing governance issues (Wyatt, 2000) 
Definition of Trustee roles and powers: 
A clear understanding of the role, responsibilities and powers of the trustee Board is essential to the 
effective operation of the Board. This should be clearly documented. Such a document should define the 
basis of the trustee boards' powers and responsibilities. It should include the primary source of the trustee 
board's power, the board delineation of function s and accountabilities between the trustee board and 
internal and external service providers, such as fund secretary administrators, investment managers and 
custodians. 
Board Mission: 
The mission statement should reflect the underlying purpose of any fund as a vehicle for retirement savings 
and ancillary purposes. 
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Code of conduct: 
The Trustee Board should collectively agree on the values by which it will operate. A code of conduct 
assists in documenting these values. Generally these should include conflicts of interest, confidentiality and 
privacy, improper conduct, due care and diligence in decision- making, including access to independent 
advice and acting in the interest of the members. 
Monitoring the performance of the Board: 
Assessments of the performance of the Board as a whole should consider measures based on the mission 
statement and strategic objectives and the Board's own governance policy. 
Legal and compliance issues: 
Good governance implies the adoption of compliance with relevant rules and legislation as a basic value for 
trustees and their funds. Trustee Boards need to develop a compliance policy framework. This includes 
identifying all relevant legislative requirements with which the trustee and the fund are required to comply. 
It also includes recording and specifying who has primary responsibility for ensuring compliance with 
specific requirements. 
Investment Management: 
Good governance requirements for effective asset management include a clear view by the Trustee Board of 
its role in the investment process as well as investment objectives which take account of the needs and 
nature of members (and employers if it is a defined benefit fund) in terms of investment return and risk and 
are therefore integral to the fund's overall mission. In determining the investment objectives, trustee boards 
will need to address the performance benchmarks to be used to judge the performance of the fund. 
A reporting structure should be in place allowing the Board to monitor the investment performance and 
review investment objectives and strategy at appropriate intervals. 
Risk Management: 
Assessment of relative risk and impact will allow the Trustee Board to ensure that risk management 
responses and procedures are developed consummerate with the potential impact of each identified risk 
area. Risk extends to all aspects of the Fund's operation. 
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Service Providers: 
A trustee Board needs to be set in place a monitoring process for each of its service providers, which should 
include regular reporting of performance against agreed standards. 
2.4. GOVERNANCE AND COMPLIANCE. 
2.4.1.Thc Financial Services Board. 
The FSB acts in a supervisory and advisory capacity. It supervises activities that concern the exercise of 
control over the financial institutions and service providers that fall within the FSB's control. In addition, the 
FSB acts in an advisory capacity to the Minister of Finance. It exercises control over certain industries, inter 
alia, the retirement funds industry. It should be noted that the banking industry and mutual banks (banks 
effectively owned by the depositors) fall beyond the scope of the FSB. Currently, however, the introduction 
of a single regulator to oversee all financial and investment services (including banks) is under serious 
consideration as part of the general tightening of controls over the financial sector. Retirement Fund 
Governance and compliance therefore falls under the auspices of the Financial Services Board. 
2.4.2.Governance and compliance. 
The legal framework in which retirement funds are required to operate has developed dramatically over the 
last few years. How does the management board of a retirement fund assess whether the fund is fully 
compliant and whether the principles of good governance are being adequately observed? 
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Compliance 
Retirement fund management boards trustees are responsible for identifying the legislative provisions 
applicable to the fund, conducting an audit of the fund and establishing where action needs to be taken. This 
should be a regular exercise undertaken by the fund to ensure that the fund is neither exposed to sanction by 
the regulatory authorities nor unnecessarily involved in complaints and litigation before the Adjudicator and 
the courts (Luyt and Roji, 2001) 
Legislation establishes certain minimum requirements with which a Fund must comply. Failure to comply 
with such requirements could result in criminal prosecution in terms of section 37(1-5) of the PFA. 
Section 37(1) of the PFA stipulates as follows: 
(1) Any person who-
(a) Contravenes or fails to comply with the provisions of section 9,9a, 13A, 13B, 35;or 
(b) Fails to make a return or transmit or deposit a scheme, report, account, 
Statement or other document when required to do so in terms of this Act; or 
(c) Contravenes the provisions of section nineteen or any condition on which 
he has been exempted from those provisions; or 
(d) Fails or refuses to furnish information, or produce documents or accounts, 
or render other assistance to the registrar when called upon to do so in 
terms of this Act; or 
(e) After the expiration of a period of six months from the commencement of 
this Act; induces or attempts to induce any person to become a member 
of, or to contribute to a fund not registered under this Act; or 
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(1) Contravenes or fails to comply with the provisions of section 10,31 or 
32A(2)or (4); 
shall be guilty of an offence. 
The section further stipulates that any penalty shall be a debt due to the FSB and may be recovered by the 
registrar by action in any competent court. The adherence to the requirements of section 37(1) is clearly a 
legal compliance issue. 
Governance 
Good governance extends beyond mere compliance with the letter of the law. It necessitates a system of 
operation based on the principles of good practice and proper conduct. Retirement fund management boards 
should apply the same principles in conducting the affairs of a fund as directors apply in conducting the 
affairs of a company. 
However, unlike the shareholders in a company, members are beneficiaries as well stakeholders in the 
corporate entity. They are, moreover, bound to become members of the fund and to submit to its rules. And, 
they have no power to create their own protections by rule amendment or by recalling and dismissing the 
trustees. Members are in a relationship of dependency on the trustees such as entitles them to expect an 
exercise of power to their benefit by trustees. 
Ultimately, governance and compliance efforts are designed to establish a culture within an organization 
that promotes prevention, detection and resolution of instances of conduct that do not conform to relevant 
legislation, industry rules and accepted market practice, as well as the industries ethical and business 
policies. This onerous task has been delegated to trustees. 
The trustees' responsibility to members therefore, is to first ensure that the fund is running according to the 
principles of good governance. 
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There are general trends summed up as greater choice and control by members; greater transparency in 
communication to members and pensioners; and more regulation that have made trustees roles more onerous 
than ever that have highlighted the importance of good governance in the retirement fund industry. This 
means that concepts such as a clear definition of roles, performance monitoring, trustee training and risk 
management to name a few have been considered by the trustee board and appropriate strategies have been 
put into place. 
According to the FSB (2000) the main principles of good corporate governance applicable to retirement 
funds are to: 
• Exercise leadership, enterprise, integrity and judgment in directing the fund so as to achieve continuing 
prosperity and to act in the best interest of the fund in a manner based on transparency, accountability 
and responsibility. 
• Monitor and evaluate the implementation of strategies and policies. Identify the key risk areas and key 
performance indicators and monitor these factors. 
• Ensure that all technology and systems used in the fund are adequate to properly run its business. 
• Ensure that members are communicated to effectively. 
• Identify the risk areas and key performance indicators and monitor these factors. 
• Regularly review processes and procedures to ensure the effectiveness of the fund's internal systems of 
control, so that its decision -making capability and the accuracy of its reporting and financial results are 
maintained at a high level at all times. 
Trustee boards are responsible for identifying the legislative provisions applicable to funds thereby ensuring 
that funds are fully compliant, with the principles of good governance being adequately observed. 
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2.5 RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE REGULATION. 
2.5.1 The Philosophy of Retirement Fund Governance Regulation. 
It is important to clarify the values, mission and philosophy surrounding retirement fund governance. In this 
respect, the role of the regulator and other stakeholders in the regulatory process and regime should be 
clarified too. The critical elements of the regulatory mechanism also need to be identified. 
The role of the regulator: 
• To ensure that input in respect of policy is provided for legislative measures so that emerging legislation 
and/or concerns are adequately and appropriately addressed; 
• To establish and enforce standards and practices to enable the financial promises to members and 
beneficiaries to be fulfilled; 
• To liaise with other regulators e.g. tax to agree actions and prevent overlap 
The regulator should balance the needs of all the stakeholders in the formulation and implementation of 
policies. 
The need for enhanced regulation: 
The rationale for enhanced regulation is often questioned if the industry is reasonably healthy. This is 
especially so if the immediate benefits of such enhancement are not clear and if the costs, in this case, for 
the retirement funds will escalate significantly. Regulation does not guarantee supreme performance but 
seeks to create a favorable climate for sound governance. 
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Regulatory style: 
The aim of sound and effective governance in the Retirement Fund Industry is to bring together the 
objectives of all the stakeholders aiming for the financial security of the members and beneficiaries of the 
fund. It is important, therefore, that a consultative approach is taken in order to enhance regulation. 
2.5.2.Retirement Fund Governance Regulation in the international context: 
The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has developed fifteen principles 
for the Regulation of Private Occupational Pensions Schemes. These are applicable in the South African 
context. 
For sake of completeness, the fifteen principles are set out below: 
• Adequate regulatory framework: 
An adequate regulatory framework for private pensions should be enforced in a comprehensive, dynamic 
and flexible way (taking into account the complexity of the schemes) in order to ensure the protection of 
pension plan beneficiaries, the soundness of pension funds and the stability of the economy as a whole. This 
framework should, however, not provide excessive burden on pensions markets, institutions, or employers. 
• Appropriate regulation of financial markets: 
A productive, diversified investment of retirement savings which spreads risk requires well-functioning 
capital markets and financial institutions. The development of advance-funded pension systems should go 
hand- in- hand with a strengthening of the financial market infrastructure and regulatory framework 
(including the development of new financial instruments and new markets such as inflation-indexed markets 
and the improved functioning of retirement annuity markets). 
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Non-discriminatory access should be granted to private pensions schemes: 
Regulation should aim at avoiding exclusions based on age, salary, gender, and period of service, terms of 
employment, part-time employment and civil status. It should also promote the protection of vested rights 
and proper entitlement process, as regard to contributions from both employees and employers. Policies for 
indexation should be encouraged. Portability of pensions rights is essential when professional mobility is 
promoted. Mechanisms for the protection of beneficiaries in case of early departure, especially when 
membership is not voluntary, should be encouraged. 
Adequacy of the private schemes: 
Proper assessment of adequacy of private schemes (risks, benefits, coverage) should be promoted, especially 
when these schemes play a public role, through substitution or substantial complementary function to public 
schemes and when they are mandatory. Adequacy should be evaluated taking into account the various 
sources of retirement. 
Regulatory system and separation: 
An institutional and functional system of adequate legal, accounting, technical, financial, and managerial 
criteria should apply to pension funds and plans, jointly or separately, but without excessive administrative 
burden. The pension fund must be legally separated from the sponsor (or at least such separation must be 
irrevocably guaranteed through appropriate mechanisms). 
Funding: 
Private schemes should be funded. While full funding exists in principle for defined contribution plans, 
other types of plans should be subject to minimum funding rules or mechanisms to ensure adequate funding 
of pension liabilities. 
Calculation techniques: 
Appropriate calculation methods for asset valuation and liabilities funding, including actuarial techniques 
must be set up and based on transparent and comparable standards. Increased reliance on modern and 
effective risk management, industry -wide risk management standards for pension funds and other 
institutions involved in the provision of retirement income should be promoted. The development of asset 
liability management techniques should be given proper consideration. 
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Supervisory structures: 
Effective supervision of pension funds must be set-up and focus on legal compliance, financial control, 
actuarial examination and supervision of managers. Appropriate supervisory bodies, properly staffed and 
funded, should be established in order to conduct when relevant off and on site supervision, at least for some 
categories of funds and in particular when problems arc reported. 
Self-Supervision: 
Self-regulation and self-regulation should be encouraged. The role of independent actuaries, custodian 
services and internal independent supervisory boards should be promoted within an appropriate regulatory 
framework. 
Fair competition: 
Regulation should promote a level playing field between the different operators and take account of the 
usefulness of a functional approach. The fair competition should benefit to the consumers and allow for the 
development of adequate private pensions markets. 
Investment: 
Investments by pension funds should be adequately regulated. This includes the need for an integrated 
assets/liabilities approach and the consideration of principles related to diversification. 
Insurance mechanisms: 
The need for insolvency insurance and/or other guarantee schemes has to be properly evaluated. These 
mechanisms may be recommended in some cases but in an adequate framework. Recourse to insurance 
mechanisms (group and reinsurance) may be promoted. 
Winding-up: 
Proper winding-up mechanisms should be put in place. Arrangements (including, where necessary, priority 
creditors' rights for pension funds) should be put in place to ensure that contributions owed to the fund by 
the employer are paid in the event of his insolvency. 
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Disclosure and education: 
Appropriate disclosure and education should be promoted as regards respective costs and benefits 
characteristics of pensions schemes, especially where individual choice is offered. Beneficiaries should be 
educated on misuse of retirement benefits especially lump sums. 
Corporate Governance: 
The corporate governance role and capacity of pension funds should be considered. This includes: the role 
of guidelines (statutory or voluntary) for governance activities; the impact of shareholder activism by 
pension funds on corporate behaviour; and the governance of pension funds themselves and the role of 
trustees. 
Stevenson (2001) believes that the above OECD principles can be applied broadly to two aspects of fund 
governance: the governance structure and governance mechanisms. 
Governance structure. 
Retirement funds should recognize the importance of effective governance structures and processes. 
However, the general framework of retirement fund governance should be addressed with relevant 
legislation. 
Governance regulations should cover aspects of the governance structure such as; 
• The responsibilities of the Board of trustees, its accountability and responsibilities 
» The extent of delegation required by the Board of trustees for duties such as investments 
management, benefit payments, auditing and actuarial analysis. The governing body should not 
absolve itself of this responsibility by delegating certain functions to external service providers like 
consultants and administrators. 
* Should set out the general framework for the division of responsibilities and accountability. 
Responsibilities should be documented and be made available to members. 
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• Governance regulations should also define the general operational responsibilities of the Board; 
Disclosure and access to information to members and beneficiaries. 
The implementation, review and monitoring of risk. 
The investment of pension fund assets in accordance with law and regulations. 
Maintenance of an adequate level of funding. 
Cost effectiveness of administration of the fund. 
vernance mechanisms. 
e Board of trustees also has a responsibility to monitor and review governance mechanisms. The following 
/er aspects of governance mechanisms; 
There should be appropriate controls in place to ensure that all persons and entities with operational and 
oversight responsibilities act in accordance with the objectives set out by the fund. 
Reporting channels between all the persons and entities involved in the administration of the pension fund 
should be established in order to ensure the effective and timely transmission of relevant and accurate 
information. 
Disclosure of information /communication to members on a timely and clear manner 
Identification, monitoring and where necessary to address conflicts of interest 
Performance assessments of trustees and service providers 
Efficient communication channels within the fund 
Redress mechanisms for members and beneficiaries. 
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)vernance regulations have not always been fully present in all countries. Most times, they have been reactive, 
roduced as a response to cases of misappropriation of pension assets. In the United Kingdom, for example, 
\ decision to enhance the responsibility of trustees over pension fund management and to increase their 
lependence vis-a -vis employers was mainly a response to the Maxwell scandal. During the 1990's, the 
ision fund of the Maxwell group lent big amounts to private companies owned by Maxwell. The fund 
tnagers under Maxwell's direction used collateral from these loans to prop up the share price of the ailing 
>up and thus increased the fund's exposure to self-investments. When the group collapsed, a very large 
-fion of the assets of the pension fund was lost. Consequent to this incident in the United Kingdom, the 
lowing were put in place as remedies. 
• The 1995 Pensions Act in the United Kingdom introduced fines for breach of rules by pension fund 
trustees and eventual disqualification. The Act also emphasized the need for sound and effective 
governance standards; 
• A self-investment limit of 5% was introduced and trustees were obliged to ensure such limits were 
adhered to; 
• The Pensions Act introduced a requirement for less leverage by the employer over the trustees and 
better independent actuarial information for trustees. 
Canada governments have been especially active in regulating the pension industry by including and then 
idening the fiduciary standards of those managing pension assets. Canada had its own villain in the 
ninion Stores case by the name of Conrad Black. Although there was pension fund legislation in Ontario 
vince, it did not spell out in precise detail the fact that pension surplus was not a corporate asset and did not 
/ide for mechanisms to keep the funds members fully informed of the status of their funds. Black unlawfully 
i to take advantage of these regulatory gaps to secure the surplus as a corporate asset. The result was a wave 
ignificant legislation reform in the area of pension benefits standards. 
le United States of America, the fiduciary standards introduced by the 1974 ERISA law were largely in 
onse to various unhappy episodes of fraud in pension fund management and fund insolvency caused by the 
cruptcy of the fund sponsor. ERISA introduced explicit governance requirements on pension fund 
agement. 
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5.3.Retirement Fund regulation in the South African context. 
an examination of the South African fund governance regulatory regime, we started from a position of 
ength where in 1956 South Africa was the first country in the world to have a Pension Funds Act. However, 
;reafter, pension funds were in many instances assumed to be an area intrinsically linked to the employer and 
many instances, indeed, pension fund administration and decisions made on investments was left to the 
iployer. This is something that the labor unions challenged vehemently, especially those under the COSATU 
nner. 
ior to 1994, members were excluded from the management of retirement funds. For many years, employees 
1 by their representative unions campaigned for inclusion in the boards of trustees responsible for managing 
nsion and provident funds. In April 1996, the Pension Funds Act was amended to create the requirement that 
least 50 % of the trustees were to be member trustees. 
Dst of the member trustees elected were laymen who lacked the necessary expertise for fund management. In 
ntrast to this position, the relative skills of fund governance rested with the employer trustees. 
tirement Fund Governance regulation in South Africa presently operates within the provisions of the Pension 
nds Act (PFA) and related regulations and all other applicable legislation. The objectives of the Board of 
ustees are defined in Section 7C and 7D of the PFA. These sections have been clarified and amplified with 
: release by the (Financial Services Board) FSB of Pension Fund (PF) Circulars in particular PF 96, PF 98 and 
108. Section 13A and Regulation 33 of the PFA deal with the employer's liability to pay contributions to 
irement fund within seven working days and provides for the appoint of a Monitoring Person to oversee the 
lole process. 
I these pieces of legislation and Circulars read together provide guidance to Boards for the good governance 
funds. It should be noted, however, that the Pension Fund circulars from the Registrar of Pension Funds and 
•i notes from SARS do not constitute law but merely represent best practices, or the Registrar's and SARS 
erpretations which, by agreement, are generally adhered to in the management and governance of funds by 
>anized industry ( Seletse, 2001) 
26/... 
/er the years, shortcomings as the ones set out below have been identified as generally being a reasonable 
scription of the shortcomings in many retirement funds in South Africa; 
• An unclear mission 
• Persons taking on mixed roles such as simultaneous governance and executive 
• Decisions taken at the wrong level 
• Service providers having agent/principal contlicts 
• Insufficient resources with respect to both time and skill 
• Available time spent on the wrong activities 
• Fraudulent activities. 
2.5.4. Retirement Fund Governance model 
The question may be posed as to what retirement fund governance model is appropriate to enhance the 
effective regulation of retirement funds. It is submitted that no single model can be identified as universally 
dominant and fund governance concerns must be addressed with reference to the specifics, the relationships 
and the operations that characterize a particular fund. 
Urwin et al (2001) indicate that contemporary governance models usually include inter alia 
• A mission statement. 
• A separation of governance/executive/operations. 
• Clear and not overlapping responsibilities and accountabilities. 
• Acknowledgement that sufficient skilled resources must be acquired. 
« Tasks that are delegated to the most capable people. 
• Transparency. 
The mission statement establishes the essential purpose of the fund. The functional roles 
and duties of the Board of the fund should be defined. In general, it is good governance for the governing 
body to have only strategic and monitoring responsibilities. This governance function includes monitoring 
compliance with all regulatory requirements. 
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Operational tasks would be handed over to an executive or a subcommittee, which would 
deal with the ongoing and delegated implementation of the trustee's responsibilities. This would fall under 
the principal officers scope. The operation function deals with the daily 
operations of the fund and this area would logically fall under the Principal Officer and 
the service providers. 
2.6.PENSION FUND GOVERNANCE REVIEWS 
ii several countries, like Canada, regulatory bodies have formulated regulation against which self-
issessments and reviews are conducted. These serve to point to areas where greater or less attention is called 
br. Governance reviews arc a good self-assessment tool. They provide assurance those adequate controls 
;xist; that reported pension information is reliable and that the fund has complied with legislation, internal 
control policies and procedures and filed documents. 
.lthough there are different types of reviews with different objectives, all retirement fund governance audits 
-e carried out to ensure that certain pension-related functions are being carried out properly. Even where 
ustees have delegated responsibilities to others, they remain responsible for ensuring proper decision-making 
rocesscs and overseeing its delegates. 
und governance reviews can be either general or specific. General audits are broad in scope but usually 
mited in depth. Specific audits are generally narrow in scope but examine a particular area or areas in more 
etail. General reviews are a good starting point for evaluating a fund's governance readiness. Special reviews 
>cus on a particular aspect of retirement fund governance especially where a general audit reveals specific 
roblems. Ongoing review of the governance procedures will show the Board of the fund how effectively it is 
lanaging the assets of the fund. Reviews must generally be repeated at reasonable intervals to ensure that 
iconsistencies that develop are revealed and rectified. 
28/... 
ioard members will often be involved and other fund personnel can conduct a review without the aid of 
xternal consultants. For instance, CAPSA has prepared the pension Plan Governance Self-Assessment 
Questionnaire. 
he aim is to enable pension fund trustees to assess how successfully they have followed effective governance 
rinciples such as fiduciary responsibility, roles and responsibilities, risk management, oversight and 
ompliance, transparency and accountability. However, funds would be encouraged to use external consultants 
ecause reviews require a wide range of expertise, such as legal, actuarial, audit, administration and in-depth 
ension knowledge and using independent parties can add greater assurance to those requesting the reviews. 
AN EXAMPLE OE GENERAL PURPOSE AND SPECIAL PURPOSE RETIREMENT FUND 









To assure the Board of trustees that: 
a Those who have been assigned key 
pension responsibilities have requisite 
skill, knowledge and experience 
a Pension responsibilities have been 
delegated to the right level within and 
outside the organization and that the 
mandates are clearly articulated. 
Q Those with pension responsibilities 
receive information that is timely accurate 
and complete 
a Performance is regularly reviewed 
a The current governance structure is 
appropriate 
u Existing performance standards are 
adequate 
Objective: 
Involves a review of 
key documentation 






• To assure the Board of trustees that 
processes are adequate to ensure that the 
fund complies with; 
Legislation 
Regulatory guidelines timely filing of 
documents with regulator. 
Involves a review of 
key documentation 
and interviews with 
relevant personnel. 
2.7. Future Movements. 
Regulation 28 
The proposed revisions to Regulation 28 place even more responsibility on the trustees' shoulders by 
requiring that they follow a 6-step process in deciding how to invest the fund's assets. This process replaces 
the limits set by the existing Prudential Investment Guidelines. 
Investment Strategy 
Trustees will be required to develop an investment strategy specifically geared to meet the needs of the 
fund. The strategy developed must address the investment objectives of the fund, which need to be 
clearly defined and which must take into account the risks critical to the fund. 
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In developing the strategy, trustees will be required to consult experts with sufficient skills and 
experience to advise them, e.g. an actuary and an investment advisor. An asset manager cannot give 
advice on the investment strategy. The strategy must set out the percentages of the fund assets that may 
be invested in various asset classes as well as the range of discretion given to asset managers. 
Investments 
The investment objectives must take into account the following issues: 
Diversification of investments 
There is a great deal of truth in the old adage that you should never place all your eggs in one basket. 
Diversification is achieved by investing in a balanced portfolio of asset classes (shares, bonds, 
property, cash and international assets). The risk of poor returns is diversified against: 
• Any one asset class performing badly 
• Currency fluctuations 
• Markets under-performing 
• Industries under-performing 
Volatility of returns 
For defined contribution funds directly invested in a market-linked portfolio, a significant fall in 
asset values could mean that members' benefits are significantly reduced. For defined benefit funds, 
the volatility of the market will result in an unstable contribution rate for the employer. 
Trustees must consider how they will deal with volatility of returns if they are invested directly in 
the market. They could for example agree to follow a certain policy to smooth returns. 
Real returns 
Fund assets must earn returns in excess of inflation to provide reasonable retirement benefits. 
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Assets failure 
If the fund is invested in the sponsoring employer, members face a double risk. If the employer 
folds, the members lose not only their jobs, but their retirement benefits too. 
Liquidity 
Liquidity is the ability to convert assets easily and rapidly into cash without substantial loss of value. 
A lack of liquidity restricts a fund's ability to make the most of investment opportunities, and 
payment of benefits and expenses may force the realization of illiquid assets when the markets are 
depressed. 
Preservation of capital 
The Trustees must consider preserving capital for members who are near retirement. Also, in cases 
where companies are restructuring and employees may be retrenched, it is important that the capital 
be preserved so that the retirement benefits will not be subjected to the volatility of the market. 
Asset Managers' Selection 
In selecting asset managers, assess how the investment house rates on the following: 
• Financial strength and reputation 
• Track record 
• Experience in managing in line with the mandate 
• Style and philosophy 
Performance Monitoring 
Performance of the asset manager has to be monitored on a regular basis as stipulated in the strategy. 
Risk and returns must be measured against specified benchmarks. If the asset managers under-
perform against the benchmark, the board of trustees must take appropriate action, as stipulated in 
the strategy document. 
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Communication 
The board of trustees must supply members with an easy-to-understand summary of the investment 
strategy. Where the fund offers member level investment choice, trustees are responsible for 
educating members about the choices available to them. The investment products offered to 
members must suit the risk profiles and ages of the members. For those members who do not 
exercise a choice, trustees must establish a default option that takes into account factors such as the 
age of the member. 
Review 
The investment strategy must be reviewed at least annually or whenever there is a material change to 
the fund. Changes that require the investment strategy to be revised include: 
• Changes in the market value of the fund 
• Changes in the age profile of the members 
• Changes in legislation 
• Changes in benefits 
• Large transfers and large-scale retrenchments. 
Trustees will have to properly document their decisions on each of the investment process stages in an 
investment strategy document. The investment strategy document also lists the names and responsibilities of 
the various role players, helping trustees to understand their own responsibilities and the degree to which the 
other role players effectively fulfill their duties. Documenting investment decisions means fund information 
can be passed easily to new trustees, thus ensuring continuity. 
Funds will be required to appoint compliance officer. This may be an official of the fund, such as the 
principal officer, or the fund auditor, or an official working for the administrator of the fund, or the 
consultant to the fund. The compliance officer must report annually to the Registrar of pension funds that: 
• The investments are being managed according to the strategy 
• The strategy has been reviewed with the fund's professional advisers, including the actuary. 
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Unclaimed Benefits 
There is very grave concern about unclaimed monies in retirement funds where beneficiaries are 
untraceable. The FSB regards an unclaimed benefit as: 
A benefit that remained unpaid for 12 months after it has become due; or 
The trustees have taken all reasonable steps to ensure that the benefit was paid and the fund was 
unsuccessful in efforts to trace the member or beneficiaries. 
The FSB under cover of a letter dated 21 July 2000 requested funds and administrators to furnish 
information on unclaimed benefits held in funds and how they were being dealt with. The purpose was to 
gain information about the size of the problem in the industry so that an appropriate case could be made to 
the policy Board. Of the 16 000 funds the letter was sent to, only 800 responded. 
An industry / FSB committee met in September 2000 to discuss guidelines for funds to trace such 
beneficiaries. There is an initiative by the FSB to establish a central database of information on unclaimed 
benefits and house such benefits in the retirement funds. In the context of establishment of such a database, 
it would be mandatory for all funds to furnish information on unclaimed benefits. The Regulations to the 
Pension Funds Act would be amended to include a provision dealing with this. In addition, a PF Circular 
would expand on the issues, such as retaining information of unclaimed benefits on transfer from one fund 
to another. 
The database system would be funded by, inter alia, levies payable by funds that have unclaimed benefits. 
This would encourage funds to ensure that unclaimed situation is avoided or reduced. Certain unclaimed 
benefits may have prescribed in terms of rules of funds; this would therefore not form part of an unclaimed 
benefit. The FSB has indicated that it would favour prescription of unclaimed benefits only after thirty 
years. 
Proper records and notice to members of unclaimed benefits should be required of funds. Because of the 
possible onerous ness of the administration, a suggestion has also been made that an industry-wide 
unclaimed benefit fund could be established to which retirement funds could transfer benefits that have been 
unclaimed. 
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It is clear that whether or not unclaimed benefits funds are to be established, the fund should itself set up 
separate accounts to hold unclaimed retirement or withdrawal benefits for at least three years before 
allowing them to be absorbed into the general assets of the fund. 
A process for dealing with such accounts will involve at least the following elements-
• A fund rule dealing with unclaimed benefits. If the treatment of unclaimed is presently not adequate, a 
trustee resolution and a rule amendment may be necessary to rectify the matter. 
• A procedure involving the following: 
• Adequate disclosure of benefits due; 
• Entry of unclaimed benefits on a register after a certain period; 
• Communication to members on unclaimed benefits; 
• Mechanisms for tracing missing beneficiaries and means for paying for these mechanisms, which 
may include charges against the special accounts; 
• Deletion from the unclaimed benefit register on satisfaction of the claim or prescription. 
• Monitoring the legislative environment for changes to laws dealing with unclaimed benefits. 
Section 37C 
This section was introduced to ensure that death benefits were properly paid to dependents and non-
dependent nominees of deceased members. With the introduction of the definition of dependant in section 1 
of the Act, section 37C has created many uncertainties. As the FSB wants to revisit section 37C, the IRF and 
Life's' Association held workshops to obtain inputs and proposals from interested parties which will be 




The method chapter of this dissertation is divided into the following subsections: 
Sample description: This subsection looks at the sampling design, the way the sample was drawn, and the 
makeup of the participants. 
Instrumentation/Research tools: This subsection describes the tools I used to collect data for this 
dissertation. 
Procedures used: Here I provide a detailed description of the steps I took to contact the trustees 
(participants), obtain their cooperation and finally how I administered the instruments. 
Data analysis: 1 describe the statistical technique I used to manipulate the collected data in this 
subsection. 
3.1.Sample description. 
The participants in this study are all member elected and employer appointed trustees. I randomly selected 
this sample but mostly using my colleagues for referrals. 
I therefore used simple random sampling design for this study. Although I did not purposefully aim so, I 
ended up with responses from defined contribution (DC) funds. However, 1 must also point out that that 
does not have any significance on the outcome of the study. 
I sent my questionnaires to the fund trustees countrywide via the mail to 400 trustees. However, I personally 
visited the local trustees (Port Elizabeth area) and personally interviewed them receiving about 87 responses 
from them. 
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The survey deliberately excluded principal officers and focused only on both company and member trustees, 
as this would elicit responses from the actual people who are supposed to be making the decisions. 
The survey itself was conducted from October 2003 to January 2004 and it reflects responses from 214 
trustees taken from a wide range of industries sectors. The funds surveyed are not necessarily Old Mutual 
clients. 
3.2.Instrumentation/Research tools. 
The instruments that I used for this study are face-to-face and telephone interviews as well as mail surveys 
administering questionnaires with fixed response questions. (See appendix) 
3.3.Procedures used. 
I mailed the letters to the randomly selected 400 participants (trustees) in the last week of October 2003. 
Most of them had already been made aware of the coming questionnaires by their consultants, as I had 
asked my colleagues to do so. However, for the non-Old Mutual clients, I used a telephone instead of a pre-
contact letter. 
I made my follow-up calls on the last week of November after receiving just 10% responses. 
Most of the responses came through in January, which is also the period 1 vigorously went out to do the 
face-to-face interviews locally (Port Elizabeth). 
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3.4. Data Analvsis. 
I used a spreadsheet based software program called STATISTICA 6 to analyze the data and produce the 
charts, graphs and tables. 
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CHAPTER FOUR. 
REPORT ON FINDINGS.l 
4.1.FUND ADMINISTRATION. 
Good governance procedures suggest that the administrator's performance should be monitored periodically 
against a predetermined and agreed set of criteria. 
It is common practice to detail these criteria in a service level agreement. I therefore included in my 
questionnaire some questions to determine whether formal service level agreements were in place and how 
frequently the administrator's performance was monitored. 
As shown in the Pie Chart, 86% of the respondents said their funds do have formal service level agreements 
in place while 13% said they were not sure and only 1% said their funds do not have such agreements. 
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Re Chart 





Question two asked the respondents if the administrator's performance was monitored on a periodic basis 
against predetermined and agreed set of criteria. The following Pie Chart depicts the respondent's responses. 
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Re Chart 





The FSB prescribes that the Fund's linancial statements be submitted to it within six of being issued. The 
responses depicted below indicate that the majority of funds are meeting the six-month dead line for the 
submission of annual financial statements. 
Re Chart 
Not sure, 11% 
One of the requirements of the Pension funds Act is that adequate indemnity and professional negligence 
cover should be maintained by the fund's administrator. The purpose of this cover is to ensure that any 
losses incurred directly as a result of mal-administration are adequately covered. Furthermore, trustees are 
expected to attest in the trustees' report in the annual financial statements that they are satisfied with the 
extent of the administrator's cover. 
This survey enquired as to the extent of the cover taken out by the administrator and whether or not 
respondents considered this to be adequate. 
The responses to this particular question were quite disappointing. Only 4% of the respondents provided 






Frequency table: Ques4 
Count j Cumulative j Percent ] Cumulative 
Count | Percent 
9 9 4.20561 4.2056 
101 110 47.19626 51.4019 
104 214 48.59813 100.0000 
Table 1. 
4.2.THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES 
The survey set out to gather information on the size of the boards of trustees to see: 
• Whether the FSB's guidelines on equal representation of member elected and employer appointed 
trustees were adhered to. 
• The extent of independent trustee representation. 
• Whether the chairperson of the fund is elected by the trustees or appointed by the employer 
• The number of trustee meetings held per annum 
• Whether formal training is provided to trustees 
• Whether the fund has formally documented code of ethics 
• Are identified risks addressed 
• Whether the fund has a trustee fidelity cover. 




On the question of independent trustees, our funds are still not complying with the FSB's guideline of 
appointing at least one independent trustee. The following Bar Chart and Frequency table depict that, with 








Frequency table: Ques6 
Count j Cumulative I Percent j 
I Count 
208 208 97.19626 
6 214 2.80374: 







The next question deals with the origin of the chairperson. The origin of the chair of the fund may 
indicate the extent of employer influence on the fund or the extent of the fund's independence. 
As we would appreciate, prior to 1994 the employees had no representation whatsoever in the trustee 
board, and subsequent years have shown this changing with this role alternating between employer and 
employee trustees. 
However, as the bar chart and frequency table below show the majority of the responses indicated the 











Frequency table: Ques7 
Count I Cumulative > Percent | Cumulative 
i Count Percent 
156 156 72.89720 72.8972 
58 214 27.10280 100.0000 
0 214 000000 100.0000 
Tabic. 3 
Guidance from FSB suggests that funds trustees should sit at least on a quarterly basis. Almost all the 







Frequency table: Ques8 
Count | Cumulative j Percent 
Count 
3 3 1.40187 
211 214 98.59813 







ufficient period for the circulation of board papers prior to trustee meetings should be provided so that 
ustces come to meetings prepared to avoid dragging the meetings and for their effectiveness. 
enerally our funds do adhere to this principle as shown below. A majority of 78% circulates board papers 
\ days prior to meetings. Only 3% are inefficient enough to circulate board papers a day before the 





























16 37 7.47664 
168 205 78.50467 










With sweeping changes in legislation requiring equal representation of employer appointed and member 
elected trustees on boards, trustee training assumes greater significance. My survey set out to ascertain 
whether trustee training is formalized to ensure that trustees are adequately equipped to discharge their 
onerous duties effectively. 
73%o of the surveyed funds indicated that their funds did not provide formal trustee training while 27% 







Frequency table: QueslO 
Count Cumulative j Percent j Cumulative 
Count Percent 
156 156 72.89720 72.8972 
58 214 27.10280 100.0000 
0 214 0.00000 100.0000 
Tablc.6 
Of the 214 surveyed funds 103 indicated that they had a formally documented code of ethics, 75 














Frequency table: Quesl 1 
Count j Cumulative i Percent i 
i Count 
103 103 48.13084 
75 178 3504673 
33 211 15 42056 








There are serious risks that face retirement's funds from time to time and it is of paramount importance 
that trustees address them timeously. 
The following are a few examples of risks that funds are faces with from time to time: 
• Poor investment performance and market volatility. 
• Administrator's systems and administration problems. 
• Poor governance and its consequences 
• Lack of investment related experience by trustees and the consequent over reliance on 
consultants/advisors. 
50/. 
The survey briefly asked the respondents whether identified risks were being addressed. 
37% answered positively, 34% negatively, 20% were not sure and 7% did not answer the question. 
Pie Chert 
Missing, 7% 








Frequency table: Ques12 
Count ! Cumulative j Percent j 
Count i 
81 81 37.85047 
73 154 34.11215 
44 198 20.56075 










Question et out to ascertain whether the funds have a fidelity cover for trustees as provided by 
legislation 89% of the funds indicated that they do have the all-important cover, only 3% said no, 














Frequency table: Ques13 
Count I Cumulative Percent j 
Count i 
190 190 88.78505 
6 196 2.80374 
13 209 6.07477 










Trustees are required to understand and appreciate their fund's rules in order for them to make 
informed day-to-day decisions concerning members' benefits. 
The survey set out to ascertain whether indeed trustees understand these rules. 
The responses were encouraging as opposed to the general perception by industry players that 
trustees do not care about these rules. 
63% indicated that they understand these rules, 24% said they do not understand them, 8% were not 










Frequency table: Ques14 
Count Cumulative ! Percent 
Count j 
134 134 62.61682 
51 185 23.83178 
18 203 8.41121 








Respondents were asked to rate their fund's regulatory compliance on a scale of 1-10. 





Valid N i Mean I Minimum | Maximum i Std.Dev. 











5 6 7 















Frequency table: Ques15 
Count [ Cumulative I Percent j 
Count ! 
3 3 1.40187 
33 36 15.42056 
25 61 11.68224 
20 81 9.34579 
6 87 2.80374 
26 113 12.14953 
8 121 3.73832 
1 122 0.46729 












The FSB has put a lot of emphasis on the compliance issue of funds operating in terms of rules and rule 
amendments that is has approved (Section 13A). The adjudicator has even indicated that he intends to apply 
the approved rules of the fund in assessing cases going forward. 
My survey question on the above yielded the following results. 













Frequency table: Ques16 
Count Cumulative i Percent j 
Count 
30 30 14.01869 
1 31 0.46729 
2 33 0.93458 
2 35 0.93458 
1 I 36 0.46729 
106 142 49.53271 











The overall level of compliance with regards to the submission of rule amendments appears to be 
high with a 71% (compliance). However, there were about 28% missing responses and a negligible 
less than 1% non-compliance. 
160 
Bar Chart 








Frequency table: Ques17 
Count I Cumulative ! Percent | Cumulative 
Count Percent 
153 153 71.49533 71.4953 
1 154 0.46729 71.9626 
60 214 28.03738 100.0000 
Tabic. 14 
4.4.INVESTMENT MATTERS. 
The management of the fund's investments is one of the more complex and important areas in the 
effective operation of the fund. Questions related to trustees' understanding of investment related 
matters. 
Paragraph 4.4.2 of Circular PF 98 states that: 
" The board should draw up a document setting out the investment policy for the fund, including 
delegation to investment managers and custodians where required, with the procedures necessary for 
monitoring investment performances and appropriateness of investments." 
When asked whether their fund's investment strategy was formally documented, the trustees 
responded as follows: 
82% said yes, 5% answered no, 2% were not sure while 11% did not respond to the question. The 








N 0 _ 
Not sure 
Missing 
Frequency table: Ques19 
Count j Cumulative ] Percent I Cumulative 
Count Percent 
176 176 82.24299 82.2430 
10 186 4.67290 86.9159 
4 190 1.86916 88.7850 
24 214 11.21495 100.0000 
Table. 15 
Question twenty of the questionnaire asked the respondents to rate their involvement in setting up 
their fund's investment strategy on a scale of 1-10. 
The general perception amongst industry players is that a great deal of strategy formulation is left to 
advisors and consultants with very limited inputs from the trustees themselves. 
58/... 
The following bar Chart and Frequency table tell their story. 
Variable 
Descriptive Statistics 
Valid N I Mean I Minimum | Maximum Std.Dev 















Frequency table: Ques20 
Count I Cumulative j Percent i Cumulative 
Count 
4 4 1.86916 
24 28 11.21495 
54 82 25.23364 
10 92 4.67290 
59 151 27.57009 
3; 154 1.40187 
22 176 10.28037 











On average 7:10 they said they do actively get involved in their fund's strategy formulation. 
This is good news and it is contrary to the belief held by many in the industry including myself. 
The realization is starting to dawn that member communication is not only necessary but also that the real 
test for the credible oversight of retirement fund strategy is indeed member communication. Again the 
general perception out there is that the only member communication is through the year-end member 
statements, which do not necessarily articulate the investment strategy. Let me also note that it is the 
requirement of the Financial Services Board that fund strategies are communicated to members. 
Question 21 of my questionnaire set out to ascertain whether the investment strategy was communicated to 
members. 
A very disappointing 97% said their funds do not formally communicated the investment strategy to its 









Frequency table: Ques21 
Count I Cumulative I Percent | Cumulative 
Count Percent 
3 3 1.40187 1.4019 
207 210 96.72897 98.1308 
4 214 1.86916 100.0000 
Tabic. 18 
Global Investment Performance Standards are ethical standards for investment performance presentation to 
ensure fair representation and full disclosure of an investment firm's performance history. 
I set out to ask the question: "Are you (trustees) familiar with investment performance standards?" 
Responses to this question indicated that there is a great deal of work that is still needs to be done on this 
front. This is one area of governance we all (industry role players) need to work hard on. 
81% of the respondents indicated that they are not familiar with these standards, 10% did not respond to the 
question while only 9% said yes. 
Re Chart 








Frequency table: Ques23 
Count Cumulative \ Percent i 
Count 
28 28 13.08411 
96 124 44.85981 
52 176 24.29907 









REPORT ON FINDINGS. 2 
Interaction analysis with Chi-Square testing of the significant relations 
Summary Frequency Table (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATAI.sta) 
Marked cells have counts > 10 
(Marginal summaries are not marked) 
DocSLAj UnderstandFR: UnderstandFR j UnderstandFR | Row 
ves ! no I n/s I Totals 
yes 117 41 15| 
no ^ § j 3j.__i _____ 0' 0I 
n/s 14 10: 3_ 

















Summary Frequency Table (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATA1 
Marked cells have counts > 10 
























5185% 37.04% 11.11% 









Summary Table: Expected Frequencies (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATAI.sta) 
Marked cells have counts > 10 












































Summary Frequency Table (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATA1 
Marked cells have counts > 10 
(Marginal summaries are not marked) 
MonitorPerf | UnderstandFR j 
feasPSi; i ves I 
yes 122 
91.04% 
&Cfti?'L> 66 67% 
60.10% 
no 4; 




i l l 5.97% 
~ 66.67% 
3.94% 
UnderstandFR | UnderstandFR I Row 





















Summary Table: Expected Frequencies (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATAlsta) 
Marked cells have counts > 10 
Pearson Chi-square: 2.76834, df=4, p=.597312 
MonitorPerf I UnderstandFR j UnderstandFR j UnderstandFR j Row 
ves I no ! n/s Totals 
yes 120.7980 45.97537 
no 5.2808 2.00985 
n/s 7.9212 3.01478' 





65/ . . . 




















Summary Frequency Table (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATA1 
Marked cells have counts > 10 
(Marginal summaries are not marked) 
FSBsubmission I Compliance 
; I " 3 
Compliance 







yes 3 28 24 17; 
H t 100.00% 







19.67% 13.93% 4 
no 0 3 0i 0 
liill iipit__ o-oo% 
0.00% 




ff| ; 0.00% 










16.67% 8.33%: 25.00% 
C 
C 
0.00% 1.64% 0.82% 2.46% C 
Summary Table: Expected Frequencies (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATAI.sta) 
Marked cells have counts > 10 










































Compliance is not independent of FSB submission (they are related) 












- o - Compliance 
3 






- • * Compliance 
7 


















Summary Frequency Table (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATA1 
Marked cells have counts > 10 
(Marginal summaries are not marked) 
Compliance { FSBsubmission i FSBsubmission 
no I n/s 
3 0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 
0.00% 0.00% 
















Summary Table: Expected Frequencies (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATALsta) 
Marked cells have counts > 10 
Pearson Chi-square: -— 
Compliance ! FSBsubmission I FSBsubmission I Row 













































Summary Frequency Table (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATA1 
Marked cells have counts > 10 
(Marginal summaries are not marked) 
LevOfldemnity ! FidelityCover ' FidelityGover i 
! yes I no ! 








All Grps 190 6 
90.91% 2.87%^ 
FidelityCover | Row 
















Summary Table: Expected Frequencies (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATALsta) 
Marked cells have counts > 10 



































Summary Frequency Table (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATA1 
Marked cells have counts > 10 























2.46% 27.05% 19.67% 
3 33 25 






















Summary Table: Expected Frequencies (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATALsta) 
Marked cells have counts > 10 
















































































Summary Frequency Table (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATA1 
Marked cells have counts > 10 
(Marginal summaries are not marked) 
NoOfTrustees j Compliance | Compliance j 
] 3 I - 4 I 





































Summary Table: Expected Frequencies (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATM.sta) 
Marked cells have counts > 10 
Pearson Chi-square: 21.4668, df=14, p=.090279 
















Compliance j Compliance I 



























Summary Frequency Table (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATA1 
Marked cells have counts > 10 
(Marginal summaries are not marked) 
IndepTrustees j Compliance 
', I - 3* 
Compliance | Compliance 
4 ; ' . | 5 
0 3 33 25 











0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
All Grps 3 33 25 
2.46% 27.05% 20.49% 
Compliance j 
6 ' - . ••! 
19 
95.00% 

















Summary Table: Expected Frequencies (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATAI.sta) 
Marked cells have counts > 10 










































Summary Frequency Table (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATA1 
Marked cells have counts > 10 





j Compliance j Compliance 











Compliance j Compliance | 























Summary Table: Expected Frequencies 
Marked cells have counts > 10 































Compliance } Com 














Summary Frequency Table (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATA1 
Marked cells have counts > 10 
(Marginal summaries are not marked) 




















Compliance j Complianc 
s 6 7 
0 0 
0.00% 0.00% 0.0( 
0.00% 0.00% 0.0( 
25 20 
100.00% 100.00% 100.0( 
20.49% 16.39% 4.9: 
20.49% 16.39% 4.9: 
25 20 
20.49% 16.39% 4.9: 
72/... 
Summary Table: Expected Freq 






uencies (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATAlsta) 
Compliance) Compliance j 



























Interaction Plot: NoOfTrustoes x Compliance 












Interaction Plot CPOngin x Compliance 































Summary Frequency Table (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATA1 
Marked cells have counts > 10 
(Marginal summaries are not marked) 
NoticePeriod I UnderstandFR j UnderstandFR | UnderstandFR 
! yes no i n/s 
0 13 1 0 
9.92% 2.08% 0.00% 
92.86% 7.14% 0.00% 
6.63% 0.51% 0.00% 
1 3 4 0 
2.29% 8.33% 0.00% 
42.86% 57.14%: 0.00% 
1.53% 2.04% 0.00% 
7 7 7 2 
5.34% 14.58% 11.76% 
43.75%: 43.75% 12.50% 









Summary Table: Expected Frequencies (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATAI.sta) 
Marked cells have counts > 10 
Pearson Chi-square: 12.9353, df=6, p=.044084 
NoticePeriod i UnderstandFR j 



































Column Percent _ 
Row Percent 
Total Percent 
Summary Frequency Table (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATA1 
Marked cells have counts > 10 
(Marginal summaries are not marked) 
NoticePeriod J Compliance I Compliance i 
I 3 .! ' 4 I 








7 0 2 
0.00% 6,67% 
: 0.00%: 16.67% 
0.00% 1.68% j 
Compliance I 












Compliance j Compliani 
6 i 7 
21 
10.00% 16.6 
16.67% .1 8.3 
1.68% 0.8 
15.00% 0.0 






Summary Table: Expected Frequencies (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATAI.sta) 
Marked cells have counts > 10 


















































Notice period is related to Compliance 
Interaction Plot NoticePenod x UnderstandFR 

























































Summary Frequency Table (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATA1 
Marked cells have counts > 10 
(Marginal summaries are not marked) 
FormTraining | Compliance j Compliance j 
! 3 I 4 
yes 3 26 
100.00% 78.79% 
•'E:.. 3 - 6 6 % 31.71% 
2.46% 21.31% 







































Summary Table: Expected Frequencies (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATAI.sta) 
Marked cells have counts > 10 










Compliance J Compliance j 



















Formal Training is related with Compliance 
Interaction Plot: FormTraining x Compliance 













Summary Frequency Table (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATA1 
Marked cells have counts > 10 
(Marginal summaries are not marked) 
EthicsCode j UnderstandFR j UnderstandFR J UnderstandFR 
















































Summary Table: Expected Frequencies (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATALsta) 
Marked cells have counts > 10 






























Eth ics code i s r e l a t e d with UnderstandFR 




Summary Frequency Table (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATALsta) 
Marked cells have counts > 10 






UnderstandFR} UnderstandFR! UnderstandFR 
ves ! no n/s 
49 18 9 
47 19 3 
29 11 3 







Summary Frequency Table (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATALsta) 
Marked cells have counts > 10 





Compliance j Compliance | Compliance I Compliance 



























Summary Frequency Table (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATA1 
Marked cells have counts > 10 
(Marginal summaries are not marked) 
RisksAddressed j UnderstandFR j UnderstandFR 
ves ! no 


































Summary Table: Expected Frequencies (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATALsta) 
Marked cells have counts > 10 
Pearson Chi-square: 2.90593, df=4, p=.573691 
RisksAddressed | UnderstandFR | UnderstandFR | UnderstandFR | Row 
yes 1 no ! n/s ! Totals 
yes 50.5319 19.40426 6.06383 
no 45.8777 17.61702 5.50532 
n/s 28.5904 10.97872 3.43085 

















Summary Frequency Table (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATA1 
Marked cells have counts > 10 
(Marginal summaries are not marked) 
RisksAddressed I Compliance j Compliance j Compliance J Compliance j Compli 
I ' 3' ' . I 4 • I . 5: i 6 I 7 
yes 3 9 14; 8 
100.00% 34.62% 58.33% 42.11%J ( 
6.67% 20.00% 31.11% 17.78% ( 
2.70% 8.11% 12.61% 7.21% ( 
no 0 11 8: 10 
0.00% 42.31% ...33,33% 52.63% 6( 
0.00% 26.83% 19.51% 24_ .39%L " 
0.00% 9.91% 7.21% 9.01% '. 
n / s .0 6 2 1 
0.00% 23.08% 8.33% 5.26% 4( 
0.00% 24.00% 8.00% 4.00%; I 
0.00% 5.41% 1.80% 0.90% 
Summary Table: Expected Frequencies (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATALsta) 
Marked cells have counts > 10 
Pearson Chi-square: 29.0267, df=14, p=.010372 
RisksAddressed 
yes 







































RisksAddressed is related to level of Compliance 













8 1 / . . . 
ANOVA tests on equality of means 
Histogram Compliance 
FSBsubmission yes Compliance = 107*1 'normal(x, 5 8411, 1 7437) 
FSBsubmission: no Compliance • Fit not drawn because of invalid range of values 




Analysis of Variance (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATAI.sta) 















n/s: NOT SURE 
All Grps. 
2-Way Tables of Descriptive Statistics (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVE' 
Smallest N for any variable: 122 
Compliance 
Means 
Compliance j Compliance 
N I Std.Dev. 
5.841121 107 1.743719 
4.000000, 3 0.000000 
6.750000 12 1.864745 
5.885246 122 1.773062 
Those, who answered 
(quest. 15) 
'No" to question 3, have significantly lower estimated level of compliance 
82/ 
Histogram Compliance 
LevOfldemnity 100 Compliance = 5*1*normal(x. 6 2. 1.0954) 
LevOfldemnity n/s Compliance - 117*1'normal(x. 58718. 1.7982) 
3 4 & 6 7 S 9 10 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 




Analysis of Variance (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATA1 .sta) 
Marked effects are significant at p < .05000 
SS | df 
Effect ! Effect 
MS 
Effect 
SS df:; J MS 
Error ! Error! Error 
F P 
0.516520 1 0.516520 379.8769 120 3.165641 0.163164 0.686979 
LevOfldemnity 
100: 
n/s: not sure 
All Grps. 
2-Way Tables of Descriptive Statistics (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY 
Smallest N for any variable: 122 
Compliance | Compliance . Compliance 
Means I N Std.Dev. 
6.200000 5 1.095445 
5.871795 117 1.798172 
5.885246 122 1.773062 
Histogram: Compliance 
NoOfTrustees: 8 Compliance ~ 36*1 *normal(x, 6 5556. 1.5574) 
NoOftrustees: 10 Compliance = 35Tnormal(x, 5.7143. 1.8876) 
NoOfTrustees: 12 Compliance = 5T1'normal(x. 5 5294. 1.7361) 





Analysis of Variance (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATAlsta) 
Marked effects are significant at p < .05000 
SS df 
Effect 1 Effect 
MS SS df 
Effect Error ! Error 
MS 
Error 






2-Way Tables of Descriptive Statistics (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY I 
Smallest N for any variable: 122 
Compliance ! Compliance ; Compliance 
Means I N Std.Dev. 
6.555556 36 1.557369 
5.714286: 35 1.887598 
5.529412 51 1.736121 
5.885246 122 1773062 
The more t r u s t e e s , the lower i s compliance. 
Histogram: Compliance 
IndepTrustees: 0 Compliance = 12CT1*normal(x. 5 8583. 1 7647) 
IndepTrustees: 1 Compliance « 2*1"normal(x. 7.5, 2 1213) 
IndepTrustees: 0 





2-Way Tables of Descriptive Statistics (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY 
Smallest N for any variable: 122 
Compliance j Compliance \ Compliance 







5.885246 122 1.773062 
Variable 
Compliance 
Analysis of Variance (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATAlsta) 













5.301776 1 5.301776 375.0917 120 3.125764 1696154 0.195286 
84/... 
Histogram Compliance 
CPOrigin Emp-e Compliance • 84Tnorma!(x. 5 6905. 1 7423) 
CPOrigin Emp-er Compliance = 38"1*normal(x. 6 3158. 1 7874) 
5 6 7 8 9 
CPOrigm Emp-e 







2-Way Tables of Descriptive Statistics (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SUR 
Smallest N for any variable: 122 
Compliance ! Compliance j Compliance 
Means I N I Std.Dev. 
5.690476 84 1.742289 
6.315789 38 1.787422 
5.885246 122 1.773062 
Variable 
Analysis of Variance (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATAlsta) 











Compliance 10.23054 1 10.23054 370 1629 120 3.084691 3.316551 0.071077 
Histogram Compliance 
Meet/Annum; 2 Compliance = Fit not drawn because of invalid range of values 
Meet/Annum 4 Compliance • l22*1'normal{x. 5 8852, 1.7731) 
5 6 7 8 
Meet/Annum 2 





2-Way Tables of Descriptive Statistics (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY C 










5.885246 122 1.773062 
Variable 
lance 
Analysis of Variance (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATALsta) 
Marked effects are significant at p < .05000 
SS df 





• df ! MS 
Error: Error 
F R 
0.00 0 380.3934 121 3.143747 0.00 
Hislogram: Compliance 
NoticePeriod: 0 Compliance = 12"1*normal(x, 5.6667, 1.557) 
NolicePeriod: 1 Compliance = 6'1*normal(x, 6.8333, 1.7224) 
NoticePeriod: 7 Compliance = 12-1*normal(x, 7.25, 1.5448) 








2-Way Tables of Descriptive Statistics (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY C 
Smallest N for any variable: 119 
Compliance ; Compliance Compliance 













5.932773 119 1.769473 
Variable 
Compliance 
Analysis of Variance (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATALsta) 













30.18409 3 10.06136 339 2781 115 2.950244 3.410350 0.019945 
Highest compliance when the notice period is 7 days 
86/. 
Histogram Compliance 
FormTrainmg yes Compliance = 82*1*norrnal(x. 57317, 1 7919) 
FormTrainmg no Compliance = 40'1"normal(x, 6.2. 1 7127) 
5 6 7 8 9 10 






2-Way Tables of Descriptive Statistics (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY L 
Smallest N for any variable: 122 
Compliance • Compliance Compliance 







5.885246 122 1.773062 
Variable 
Compliance 
Analysis of Variance (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATAlsta) 
Marked effects are significant at p < .05000 
SS df MS SS 





5.895882 1 5.895882 374.4976 120 3.120813 1.889213 0.171852 
Histogram Compliance 
RisksAddressed: yes Compliance = 45*1'norma1(x. 5 6222. 1 6027) 
RisksAddressed no Compliance <* 41*1*normal(x. 5.9268. 1 752) 






n/s: NOT SURE 
All Grps. 
2-Way Tables of Descriptive Statistics (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVE 
Smallest N for any variable: 111 
Compliance \ Compliance j Compliance 
Means N Std.Dev: 
5.622222 45 1.682651 
5 926829 41 1.752002 
6.720000 25 1.837571 
5.981982 111 1.778569 
Variable 
Compliance 
Analysis of Variance (RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE SURVEY DATALsta) 
Marked effects are significant at p < .05000 
SS df MS SS df | MS F p 
Effect I Effectj Effect Error j Error I Error 
19.5657C 2 9.782849 328.3983 108 3.040725 3.217276 0.043933 
Highest 
CHAPTER FIVE. 
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
5.1.Fund Administration. 
On the whole trustees seem to be complying with guidelines as set by the Financial Services Board. 
However, what is disappointing is that the majority of the respondents could not quantify the extent of their 
administrator's fidelity and indemnity cover. 
The Pension Funds Act is vocal in this regard in that it requires that an adequate indemnity and professional 
negligence cover be maintained by the fund's administrator. The purpose of this cover is to ensure that any 
losses incurred directly as a result of mal-administration are adequately covered. This survey enquired as to 
the extent of the cover taken out by the administrator and disappointingly the majority of the trustees did not 
know anything about it. 
This indicates that there's still some work that needs to be done as far as trustee orientation and training is 
concerned. 
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5.2.Board of Trustees. 
Contrary to the general perception that there is a high degree of employer influence over funds, there is an 
indication that the employees are the ones with more influence. Although the chairmanship is alternating 
between the employer appointed and employee elected trustees from year to year, the survey shows that the 
employee elected trustees generally occupies it (chairmanship). This can be attributed to the labour 
movement activism that is prevalent in our country. 
It is good governance for trustees to seek external assistance in fulfilling their duties and our survey shows 
that overwhelmingly the majority of funds neglect the appointment of independent trustees. 
With the change in the composition of the trustee boards, trustee training is becoming more and more 
important. With the survey I noted that the majority of funds do provide some formal training, however 
there are areas like investments that still need more emphasis. 
There are major risks that the respondents identified, and these are the following: 
• Poor investment performance and market volatility. 
• Administrator's systems and administration problems. 
• Poor governance and its consequences. 
• Lack of investment related experience by trustees and the consequent over reliance on advisors. 
• Poor quality of data and information 
• The "sweeping" HIV/AIDS 
Disappointing though is the fact that when asked if identified risks are addressed, the majority of the 
respondents indicated largely that the risks were not addressed or they were not sure and some did not 
respond at all. 
Identified risks need to be addressed as soon as possible before they become insurmountable problems. 
Emphasis once again should be put on trustee training and workshops where Circulars could be discussed 
and commented on. 
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5.3.Legal Compliance. 
Respondents rated their funds 6 out of 10 which is contrary to industry belief that compliance could be a 
low of 2 or 3 out of 10 even as perceived by most trustees. However, the limitation here is that I could not 
verify these responses. 
Most funds surveyed did not comply with the requirements of Section 13A and the requirements governing 
the submission of rule amendments. 
Section 13A states that " Notwithstanding any provision of the rules of a registered fund to the contrary, any 
contribution payable in respect of any member of the fund to the fund shall be paid directly to the fund by or 
on behalf of the member within a period of seven days after the expiration of the period in respect of which 
the contribution is being paid, and the board shall, not later than the first business day following the day on 
which the fund received the contribution, deposit the contribution in the name of the fund with an institution 
registered under the Banks Act of 1965..." 
Respondents did raise some concerns with regards to the length of time taken by the FSB to provide 
approval for rule amendments. Action is needed in this area especially given the Pension Adjudicator's 
intention to rely on registered rules when making decisions. 
This sub question was prompted by my own experiences with rule amendments submitted with the FSB. 
5.4.Investment matters. 
The board of trustees is ultimately responsible for the fund's investments. In order to demonstrate effective 
and prudent investment management, trustees should formulate a suitable investment strategy for the fund, 
select appropriate fund managers, provide clear mandates to those fund managers and monitor investment 
performance against predetermined and appropriate benchmarks. 
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The results of this survey were quite disappointing with the majority of the respondents saying their funds 
do not comply with regulation 28, not familiar with GIBS, fund's investment strategy not formally 
documented and the fund's strategy not communicated to members. 
Regulation 28 is concerned with limits relating to assets in which a Registered Fund may invest. 
This is a serious shortcoming and the industry players should really come up with remedies. 
Training is one crucial aspect of consideration to this end. Here I'm referring to the initial and ongoing 
training by professional trustee trainers. 
Initiatives like the one spearheaded by Old Mutual Actuarial Consultants (OMAC) where these 
shortcomings are identified and customized training provided should be commended. I think there is indeed 
still a great deal of work that needs to done in so far as retirement fund governance is concerned in South 
Africa. 
There are some issues that the FSB needs to be jerked up on (like rule amendments turn around times) and 
may be some sections of the Pension Funds Act need to be revisited in order to tighten up the funds 
governance. 
I think a more comprehensive survey by pioneers (in the customized trustee training area) like Old Mutual 
needs to be done, especially in three years to see the effects of their initiative on retirement fund governance 
as a whole. 1 would also recommend a larger sample for a follow up survey. 
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APPENDICES 
THE CAF CASE 
A recent case of special interest for governance and compliance in the retirement fund industry is the case of 
Mostert NO v Old Mutual Life Assurance Company (South Africa) Ltd - Case No 16402197, CPD. The 
salient facts were as follows: 
1. From its inception inl958, the CAF Pension Fund operated exclusively by means of policies of 
insurance issued by Old Mutual to the Fund's Employer (initially Moores SA (Pty) Ltd) who ceded its 
rights, title and interest in the original policy to Addressograph- multigraph SA (Pty) Ltd (later known as 
AM International South Africa (Pty) Ltd and AMK Technologies (Pty) respectively). 
2. Throughout Old Mutual's involvement with the Fund, the Fund had no trustees and all instructions 
pertaining to the Fund emanated from the Employer. The last policy in terms of which Old Mutual 
rendered administrative, actuarial and investment services in respect of the Fund, was issued to the 
Employer and provided that either the Employer or Old Mutual could terminate Old Mutual's aforesaid 
services by giving the required notice. 
3. During April 1994, after Laurie Korsten had obtained all the shares in the Employer from its US parent 
company, the Employer terminated Old Mutual's administrative and actuarial services and appointed 
Van der Linde De Villiers (Pty) Ltd as administrators and Gert van der Linde as actuary for the Fund. 
4. As a result, Old Mutual and the Employer considered Old Mutual's contractual obligations regarding the 
drafting and registration of rule amendments to have been terminated. As the rules of the Fund still 
provided that the Fund should operate on a deposit administration basis with Old Mutual, Van der 
Linde's appointment necessitated a rule amendment. It was generally accepted practice that the new 
benefits administrator would be responsible for drafting and registering such amendments (Van der 
Linde, in fact, did advise the Registrar of his appointment and that new rules were being drafted). 
5. During may 1994 Van der Linde gave Old Mutual notice of the Employer's intention to terminate Old 
Mutual's investment services and in November 1994 he copied Old Mutual with a letter from the 
Employer, signed by its managing director, Laurie Korsten, to effect payment of the proceeds of the 
policy to CAF (Pty) Limited, being the new investment manager appointed by the Employer. Old 
Mutual paid the proceeds over in accordance with the Employer's instructions and subsequently had no 
further involvement with the Fund. 
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6. It was only during 1997/98 that Old Mutual learnt that: 
• Van der Linde only submitted new rules for the Fund during May 1995 (due to difficulties 
encountered in getting L.Korsten's approval), which were registered on 19 June 1995, with 
retrospective effect from 1 March 1995 (and not 1 May 1994, due to an error on the part of Van der 
Linde); 
• In terms of these rules the management of the Fund vested in three Trustees of the Fund appointed 
by the Employers, being Jan and Laurie Korsten and Riaan Els. 
• CAF (Pty) Ltd (a company also controlled by Laurie Korsten) remained the investment manager of 
the Fund until the Fund was placed under curatorship during 1997. Although the Registrar did give 
permission for a loan from the Fund to AMK Technologies, in the amount of R 3.6 million, CAF 
(Pty) Ltd loaned almost all the monies which it had to invest to the said company and another 
company, Korfinans. The major portion of such loans was effected subsequent to the registration of 
the rules in June 1995. The aforesaid three companies were all liquidated in 1997. 
During December 1997 the curator instituted action against Old Mutual for damages suffered by the 
Fund. Having regard to these facts Old Mutual was of the view that it was not remiss in its actions and 
not responsible for the losses suffered, which view was confirmed by its attorneys and counsel, and 
therefore Old Mutual defended the action. 
The Cape High Court last year dismissed the claim of the Fund on the basis that Old Mutual did not 
cause the damage suffered by the Fund. The Court held that Old Mutual was not responsible for the 
losses of the Fund occasioned by the loans to the "Korsten" companies and that, in terms of the evidence 
led in the course of the trial, such losses would in all probability have been incurred even if Old Mutual 
had insisted upon rule amendments and a fund account prior to effecting payment. 
On appeal the Supreme Court Appeal, however, ruled that Old Mutual should pay the Fund's full claim 
because the directive from the Employer was not valid as the Fund had been exempted and its rules 
provided for it to be underwritten by Old Mutual. Smallberger J held as follows: 
" A Pension Fund, its legal status, and the rights and obligations of its members and the employer, 
are governed by the Fund rules , relevant legislation and the common law (TEK Corporation Provident 
Fund and Others v Lorentz 1999(4) SA 884(SCA) at 894 B-C). The Rules amount to the fund's 
constitution (Abrahamse v Connock's Pension fund 1963(2) SA 76(W) at 78D-E)." [At 30] 
" It is one thing to give amended rules retrospective effect after registration; it is something entirely 
different to seek to give them binding effect before registration". [At 60] 
" The provisions of the Act regarding the filing, registration and effect of rules are perfectly clear, as 
is also their purpose. There is no basis whatsoever for contending that these provisions have been 
repealed or were entitled to be ignored because of some practice."! At 71] 
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The Court also held that none of the amounts paid over to CAF (Pty) Ltd, including approximately R23 
million transferred by CAF (Pty) Ltd into bank accounts in the name of the Fund, was effectively under 
the control of the Fund. 
The Supreme Court of Appeal judgment, however, did not order a fixed sum to be paid and there was a 
significant difference of opinion about the sums involved. The order was that Old Mutual had to pay the 
policy benefits together with the legal interest rate of 15.5%. From this had to be deducted "all amounts 
recovered to date by the plaintiff on behalf of the CAF Pension Fund, interest to be adjusted accordingly 
from the date of each such recovery". 
The difference arose around the following points: 
• The schedule of recoveries provided by the curator reflected an amount of only R6 million recovered 
on behalf of the Fund prior to 8 April 1997, while a certificate issued by the curator's auditors and 
incorporated into an affidavit made by him, reflected an amount of R16 million recovered on behalf 
of the fund up to that date; 
• The method of interest computation: the different methods used by the curator and Old Mutual's 
external legal advisers resulted in a difference of over R7 million. 
• The Korsten's had also waived their rights to a pension, an amount of nearly R7 million that the 
curator refused to give credit to Old Mutual for. 
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APPENDIX B. 
RETIREMENT FUND GOVERNANCE TN SOUTH AFRICA 
INSTRUCTIONS. 
Please answer the following questions regarding your fund. 
Please note: Answer yes or no where needed but also indicate if not sure about the answer. Where you 
are required to give a number on a scale of 1-10, note that 1 represent the worst scenario, 5 the 
average and 10 the best scenario. But if you don't know the answer please leave the question blank. 
The same applies to those questions that require percentages. 
Fund Administration. 
1. Does your Fund have a documented Service Level Agreement in place with the administrator? 
2. Is the administrator's performance monitored on a periodic basis against predetermined criteria? 
3. Were the Fund's annual financial statements for the last 3 years submitted to the FSB within the 
prescribed 6 months period. 
4. What is the level of your administrator's indemnity and professional negligence cover? 
Board of Trustees. 
5. What is the number of trustees constituting the board? 
6. How many independent trustees are in your board? 
7. What is the origin of your chairperson, is he/she from the employer or employee trustees? 
8. How many trustee meetings are held per annum? 
9. What is the number of days notice for trustees meetings that board papers are circulated? 
10. Is formal training provided to trustees? 
11. Does the Fund have a formally documented code of ethics? 
12. Are identified risks being addressed? Does your Fund have a trustee fidelity cover? 
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Legal Compliance. 
13. Do you fully understand and appreciate your Fund rules? 
14. Rate your Fund's regulatory compliance on a scale of 1-10. 
15. What is the percentage of contributions not received by the Fund in compliance with Section 
13 A? (Any FSB concerns in this regard?) 
16. What is the percentage of rule amendments submitted to the FSB within the 60 day prescribed 
period? 
Investment matters. 
17. What is the composition of the investment sub-committee? 
18. Is your Fund's investment strategy formally documented? 
19. On a scale of 1-10, what is the level of involvement of trustees in setting the investment strategy? 
20. Is the Fund's investment strategy communicated to members? 
21. Are you familiar with investment performance standards? 
22. Did your Fund comply with regulation 28 at the last year-end? 
General. 
Identify the major risks that your fund's trustees are faced with. 
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